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ARTICLES
FAMILY LAW AND FEMALE
EMPOWERMENT
Andrea B. Carroll*
"Ball buster." "Soul crusher." "Whimpy whiner."' Feminism,
still a dirty word in many American circles, has certainly endured
its share of castigation. Many men run scared when it is uttered.
Women frequently shun it. Those who choose to embrace it are rou-
tinely criticized.2
The feminist movement has been slow to start and has spanned
decades. However, things appear to be shifting. Today, many argue
that feminism has found a new stride, a fourth wave. The globaliza-
tion of culture fostered by the Internet has, in large part, sparked
this new wave. "[I]t is increasingly clear that the Internet has facil-
itated the creation of a global community of feminists who use [it]
both for discussion and activism."3
Social media has made it cool to be a feminist. Emma Wat-
son's United Nations speech as spokeswoman for HeForShe, an
international gender equality campaign, went viral, receiving more
than seven million views on YouTube.4 The response to this video
* Professor of Law and Interim Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, LSU
Law Center. Thanks are due to the American Association of Law Schools and
the participants of its 2015 sessions on Family Law, and Sex, Gender, and the
Law for their extensive commentary and criticism, and to the LSU Law Center
for its continuing and generous support of my research on family building and
improvement. Alex Aughtry (LSU Law Class of 2015) and Henry Rauschen-
berger (LSU Law Class of 2017) provided excellent research assistance.
1 Anne Reeves, Feminist Has Become a Dirty Word: Anne Reeves, PENN
LIVE (Sept. 26, 2014, 10:22 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/living/index.
ssf/2014/09/feminist hasbecome a dirty wo.html.
2 See, e.g., Bianca Pencz, Beyonce:Feminist or Fauxminist, HUFFINGTON PosT
CANADA, (Apr. 26, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/04/26/be-
yonce-feminist n_1456640.html?.
Ealasaid Munro, Feminism:A Fourth Wave?, POLITICAL STUDIES AssoCIA-
TION, http://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/feminism-fourth-wave (last visited May
22, 2015).
4 normaljean2, Emma Watson UN Speech, YouTUBE (Sept. 21, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-iFl4qhBsE (transcript available at Emma
Watson: Gender Equality Is Your Issue Too, UN WOMEN (Sept. 20, 2014), http://
© 2017 Andrea B. Carroll. All rights reserved.
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exemplifies the burgeoning discussion of modern feminism in the
internet age.
Family law remains a striking exception. Domestic relations
law has struggled with feminism for decades, and it has never truly
found a place in the family law arena. The crux of the problem, no
doubt, is that family law has always had a difficult time defining
feminism in context. From an economic perspective, is it feminist
to provide economic assistance to women, who studies continue to
show suffer far more than do their male counterparts in the wake
of divorce? Or does feminism instead require a recognition of the
ability of women to make equivalent financial contributions to a
marriage as men, and thereby accept only pure equality of treat-
ment? A series of incongruent doctrines makes it clear that family
law truly does not know what feminism should mean.
Consequently, the system of family law largely fails to achieve
one of feminism's most fundamental tenets: empowerment. This
Article will sample a diverse cross-section of family law and ana-
lyze it from a feminist perspective. Part I will consider the state of
a woman's decision-making authority in the reproductive context.
Parts II and III will explore the modern proliferation of domestic
violence-related legislation, analyzing state law schemes that pro-
vide for both punitive damage recoveries and permanent spousal
support. Part IV will address marital property regimes around the
country. Across all contexts, the Article will demonstrate that, often
despite the best intentions of legislators and jurists, family law
wholly fails to empower women.
What results is a system of modern family law that has become
increasingly anti-feminist. As this fourth wave of feminism dawns,
family law has a rare chance to respond appropriately to feminist
concerns. Women across the United States are depending on it.
I. REPRODUCTIVE DECISION-MAKING: WOMEN
AS NON-AUTONOMOUS PERSONS
It has long been recognized that laws regulating women's
choices in the reproductive sphere achieve a result far short of
empowerment. From the pre-Roe v. Wade era to today, women
suffer more intrusions upon their reproductive decisions than do
men.6 As reproductive technology has continued to develop, the
www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/9/emma-watson-gender-equality-is-
your-issue-too.).
I See generally CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, 20/20 Vision 2011-2012 Annu-
al Report (2012), http://www.reproductiverights.org/document/annual-re-
port-2011-2012.
6 Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 E3d 229,
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non-traditional family has become more prevalent.' More forms
of parenting have become possible, but family law has not simul-
taneously evolved to advance the interests of women. This trend
is clear in modern surrogacy and second-parent-egg-donation. In
both instances, American law has continued in a direction that does
not support women's reproductive choices, sending a powerful mes-
sage about just how valuable those choices are.
A. Surrogacy: A Protectionist Regime
Surrogacy exploded onto the American reproductive scene in
the late 1980s, shortly after the first successful in-vitro fertilization
in the United States made it a new avenue for addressing female
infertility.' Before the close of the decade, state supreme courts had
to grapple with difficult custody, contractual, and parentage issues
raised by parties to surrogacy contracts gone awry.9
At the outset of the surrogacy debate, many states simply
refused to recognize or enforce surrogacy agreements of any kind.10
Thus, if the intended parents breached the contract, surrogates
were left with no means of enforcement." Likewise, should the
surrogate choose to renege on the contract to parent the resulting
child, intended parents generally found themselves with no legal
recourse to enforce their contractual agreements.12 In both the tra-
ditional and gestational forms of surrogacy, the courts refused to
honor both the reproductive choices of the intended mother and
those of the surrogate.13
262-64 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded to Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct.
1557 (2016).
If not the new norm. See: Gretchen Livingston, Fewer Than Half of US.
Kids Today Live in a 'Traditional' Family, PEw RES. CTR. (Dec. 22, 2014), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/22/less-than-half-of-u-s-kids-today-
live-in-a-traditional-family.
8 MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN IS-
SUES 5 (1990) (observing that in the 1980's, surrogacy had become "widespread"
and was "fast becoming a booming industry").
9 See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
I0 Id.
I Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of
Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 21, 23 (1989); see also
Katherine Drabiak, Carole Wegner, Valita Fredland & Paul R. Helft, Ethics,
Law, and Commercial Surrogacy:A Call for Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
300, 303 (2007).
12 See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1238; In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25
Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1231 (1994).
13 R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (holding that the surrogacy
agreement between the father and surrogate mother was unenforceable, where
surrogate changed her mind and refused to part with the child); JR. v. Utah, 261
E Supp. 2d 1268, 1270 (D. Utah 2002); Posner, supra note 11, at 23.
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This result was not surprising in the 1980s, as the technology
supporting gestational surrogacy was new and foreign to policy-mak-
ers.14 Additionally, family law has historically been slow to develop,
even in a rapidly changing technological and social climate.
More surprising is how little results have changed, even after
more than thirty years of courts grappling with surrogacy contract
enforceability questions. Traditional surrogacy, which results in the
surrogate relinquishing a child to whom she is genetically related, is
still impermissible in many American states. 16 Gestational surroga-
14 Scorr B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
BRAVE NEw FAMILIES? 77 (Preager, 1994).
" In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807,841 (Tenn. 2014) (J. Koch, concurring) ("There
can be no denying that the ability to create children using assisted reproductive
technology has far outdistanced the legislative responses to the myriad of legal
questions that surrogacy raises."). See also Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-LegalAc-
ceptance ofNew Technologies:A Close Look atArtificial Insemination, 77 WASH.
L. REV. 1035, 1119 (2002) (noting "the socio-legal reluctance to accept the new
applications of the technology to surrogacy and to the insemination of unmar-
ried women that emerged in the 1970s, subsequent to the legalization of the
technology" and positing that "the acceptance process of Al demonstrates the
law's strength as an inhibitory force and its relative weakness as a technology
promoting device").
16 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1246-50 (1988) (concluding that enforcement
of a traditional surrogacy agreement violated various statements of public poli-
cy); In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1222 (" [E]nforcement of a
traditional surrogacy contract by itself is incompatible with the parentage and
adoption statutes already on the books."); R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 796-797 (find-
ing compensation problematic and requiring post-partum consent) ("We rec-
ognize that there is nothing inherently unlawful in an arrangement by which an
informed woman agrees to attempt to conceive artificially and give birth... [i]f
no compensation is paid beyond pregnancy-related expenses and if the mother
is not bound by her consent to the father's custody ... unless she consents after
a suitable period has passed following the child's birth, the objections we have
identified in this opinion to the enforceability of a surrogate's consent to custo-
dy would be overcome."). But see In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 812 ("[T]he public
policy of this state does not prohibit the enforcement of traditional surrogacy
contracts, but does impose certain restrictions. As is relevant here, our public
policy requires compliance with the statutory procedures for the termination
of parental rights and does not allow parties to terminate the parental rights of
a traditional surrogate through judicial ratification of a surrogacy contract pri-
or to the birth of the child"); Doe v. New York City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d
180, 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (pointing out that NY Domestic Relations Law
Art. 8, §§ 121-124 does not distinguish between gestational surrogacy contracts
and traditional surrogacy arrangements); A.L.S. ex rel. J.P v. E.A.G., No. A10-
443,2010 WL 4181449, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010) (declining to address
the validity of traditional surrogacy agreements as a matter of public policy and
stating that such determination was appropriate for the legislature, which had
remained silent on the point); In re ET.R., 833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013) (surroga-
cy agreement enforceable to extent not contrary to best interests of the child or
requiring any termination of parental rights); Mary Doe v. John Roe, 717 A.2d
4 [Vol. 24.1
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cy, arguably more societally palatable as it permits relinquishment
of a child by a woman whose sole role was in gestating the child,
rather than in providing any genetic material, has not received
widespread approval either.' After a struggle spanning more than
thirty years, gestational surrogacy contracts will be recognized and
enforced in only a dozen states." Several states, including New Jer-
sey and Louisiana,19 have undergone high profile battles to legis-
late in favor of gestational surrogacy only to see those bills fail to
become law.20 The overwhelming national trend has been to reject
the reproductive choices of women through surrogacy.
Those who reject surrogacy as a valid procreative decision
believe surrogacy is a societal evil because it commodifies and
exploits women and their reproductive capacity.21 For years, schol-
ars and reproductive conservatives have highlighted the psycholog-
ical risks to women involved in surrogacy.22 Opponents of surrogacy
argue women are likely to be exploited in the process, especially if
706 (Conn. 1998) (ignoring the invalidity of a traditional surrogacy agreement,
and ordering the specific performance).
17 See A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948,954, (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); In
re ETR., 833 N.W.2d at 651 (finding provisions requiring termination of surro-
gate's parental rights unenforceable). Two states ban all surrogacy contracts as
contrary to public policy regardless of whether the woman carrying the baby is
compensated or not. See, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2011); N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney Supp. 2017).
18 See Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guide-
lines for International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249,2258-60 (2012) (categoriz-
ing states that either permit, regulate, or ban "commercial" and/or "altruistic"
surrogacy contracts).
19 On March 19, 2015, the New Jersey Assembly Human Services Commit-
tee reported favorably and with amendments to a bill seeking to allow surroga-
cy agreements in some circumstances. ASSEMBLY HUMAN SERVS. COMM., STATE-
MENT WITH AMENDMENTS, A. 2648, 1st Sess. (N.J. 2014). The bill has yet to pass
into law.
20 See Susan K. Livio, Christie Again Vetoes Bill Regulating Surrogate Par-
enting Pacts in N.J., NJ.com (June 30, 2015, 5:27 PM), http://www.nj.com/pol-
itics/index.ssf/2015/06/christie-again vetoes-bill-regulating-surrogate-pa.ht-
ml; Emily Lane, Bobby Jindal Again Vetoes Bill Allowing for Legal Surrogacy
Births in Louisiana, NOLA.com (May 10, 2016, 1:29PM), http://www.nola.com/
politics/index.ssf/2014/05/bobby jindal-again vetoes bill.html.
21 See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); In
re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1242. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the
Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. Io9 (2009).
22 Kathleen Parker, Opinion, Kathleen Parker: The Exploitation ofSurrogate
Mothers,WASH. POST (May 24,2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
kathleen-parker-the-exploitation-of-surrogate-mothers/2013/05/24/90bc59e-
c4b0-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca story.html?utmterm=.1f7ebbacc21d (stating
that "we haven't scraped the surface of the metaphysical, spiritual, emotional,
and psychological issues" that accompany the surrogacy business).
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they are being monetarily compensated.23 Both scholars and legis-
lators have warned that only women in the lowest socio-econom-
ic classes will volunteer as surrogates, because of the promise of a
hefty financial reward. Accordingly, many states have moved to ban
compensated surrogacy arrangements altogether.24 The "renting of
the womb," then, remains impermissible in all but a dozen states. 25
Even in the modern day and age, most states cannot seem
to move past objections to women being paid for playing a role in
the reproductive process. Men "get paid for their efforts, skills, and
services," even in the reproductive context, but the view remains
that "women, being women, should do their woman-things out of
purity of heart and sentiment. Women are too delicate, too pure, to
be tainted by filthy lucre." 26
More importantly, most states continue to reject even uncom-
pensated gestational surrogacy arrangements. 27 In this context, no
23 Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Hodas
v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 326 (Mass. 2004); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796
(Mass. 1998).
24 Washington, Louisiana, Nebraska and Kentucky prohibit by statute
surrogacy contracts that provide for compensation. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 26.26.230-26.26.240 (West 2015); Act of August, 1, 2016, No. 494, § 2719,
http://www.legis.1a.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1011810 (to be codified
at La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2719); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 200 (2008); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.590 (West 2013).
25 Andrea B. Carroll, Discrimination in Baby Making: The Unconstitution-
al Treatment of Prospective Parents Through Surrogacy, 88 IND. L.J. 11871191-
92 (2013). See also Mortazavi, supra note 18, at 2258-60 (2012) (categorizing
states that either permit, regulate, or ban "commercial" and/or "altruistic" sur-
rogacy contracts); Emily Gelmann, "I'm Just the Oven, It's Totally Their Bun":
The Power and Necessity of the Federal Government to Regulate Commercial
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intend-
ed Parents, 32 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 159, 184 (2011); Flavia Berys, Comment,
Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California Courts Should Proceed
When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL.W. L. REV. 321,322
(2006); Iris Leibowitz-Dori, Note, Womb for Rent: The Future of International
Trade in Surrogacy, 6 MINN. I GLOBAL TRADE 329,343 (1997).
26 Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood:An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, Wis. L. REV. 297 380 (1990)
(discussing In re Baby M).
27 The District of Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, and New York expressly
prohibit uncompensated surrogacy by statute. D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2016); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (LexisNexis 2013); MICH. COMP. LAws § 722.855 (2011);
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 122 (McKinney Supp. 2017). Delaware prohibits uncom-
pensated surrogacy through case law. Hawkins v. Frye, No. 34,248, 1988 LEX-
IS 31, at *7 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 25, 1988). Kansas does so through an Attorney
General opinion. 54 Op. Kan. Att>y Gen. 82-150 (1982). California, Florida, Illi-
nois, Nevada, Texas, and Utah prohibit traditional surrogacy even where uncom-
pensated; Illinois, Texas, and Utah further prohibit uncompensated agreements
6 [Vol. 24.1
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financial exploitation issues arise, yet states continue to refuse to
sanction the practice. Women are too hormonal, they say, to be held
to the contracts they have formed. Women don't know their own
minds, and simply cannot anticipate the trauma that will result from
relinquishing a child for whom they have acted as a gestational car-
rier. The result is a body of state law that "exalts a woman's experi-
ence of pregnancy and childbirth over her formation of emotional,
intellectual and interpersonal decisions and expectations, as well as
over others' reliance on the commitments she has earlier made."28
This approach to surrogacy is troubling because it serves to
dishonor the reproductive will of two consenting adult women.
There is no evidence that women who undertake to act as gesta-
tional surrogates in the United States agree to such arrangements
in ignorance or because they are financially desperate and subject
to exploitation by the rich and greedy.29 To the contrary, the evi-
dence shows that most gestational surrogates in this country are
white, middle-class, married, and have already given birth to and
raised at least one child.30 Refusing to honor surrogates' contracts
sends a powerful societal message about the perceived "unpredict-
ability of women's intentions and decisions."31
For intended mothers in surrogacy arrangements, the frustra-
tion of their will is even more egregious. In the gestational surrogacy
context, the intended mother may have contributed genetic materi-
al, and therefore may be the "biological" mother of the child.3 2 Still,
any agreement she makes under which she contracts for the right to
parent her own child would be unenforceable.33 In most states, that
unenforceability triggers the application of the rule that the surro-
gate-as the woman who gave birth to the child-is the child's legal
mother.34 By refusing to recognize the intended mother's autono-
where other contractual requisites are not met. Khiara M. Bridges, Windsor,
Surrogacy, and Race, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1125, 1131-32 (2014) (citing COURTNEY
G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAw § 4:2 (2013-2014 ed. 2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
47 / 20(a)(2) (West 2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(5) (West 2013);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(f) (LexisNexis 2012).
28 Shultz, supra note 26, at 384.
29 Posner, supra note 11, at 25.
o Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 . Soc. ISSUES 21, 31 (2005);
Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 72, 73 (1988).
1 Shultz, supra note 26, at 379.
32 In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 819 (Tenn. 2014).
" IR. v. Utah, 261 E Supp. 2d 1268, 1272 (D. Utah 2002)
34 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 1244 (N.J. 1988); In re T.S., 16 A.3d 386,398
(N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) aff'd, 54 A.3d 263 (N.J 2012).
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my, these states continue to disempower women, negatively affect-
ing intended mothers perhaps even more so than surrogates.
Current law deprives both intended mothers and surrogates
of the freedom to make reproductive decisions. Men in similar sit-
uations (i.e., sperm donation) are not so deprived. No regulatory
controls determine the price of sperm.35 No state laws tell men they
cannot provide their gametes or services for reproductive purposes,
whether for compensation or not.36 No laws refuse to honor the
will of the men who make informed decisions to create, but not
to parent, children through gamete donation.37 And no legislatures
seem to hide behind questions surrounding the long-term impact of
gamete donation on the resulting children.38
Men are consistently empowered in the reproductive deci-
sion-making process while women are not. Perhaps the most dis-
turbing feature of this dichotomy is that often men, and not women,
make the laws depriving women of the reproductive decision-mak-
ing freedom men possess. Although there have been improvements
over the last several decades, state legislatures and the judicia-
ry remain dominated by men.39 With less involvement in the leg-
islative and judicial conversation, it is not surprising that female
empowerment is not a core value of the law relating to reproductive
rights. Affording men and women differing levels of control over
their procreative choices sends a startling message of female disem-
powerment of which all policymakers should be cognizant.
B. Egg Lending Absent Donative Intent:An Archaic Regime
Just as troubling as the American states' refusal to accept
and regulate surrogacy on a widespread basis is its fear and dis-
comfort with the contribution of female gametes by anyone oth-
er than the intended mother of the child. American law treats all
women who provide eggs for reproductive use, and do not intend
1 ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, NORVAL D. GLENN & KAREN CLARK, My DADDY'S
NAME IS DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM
DONATION 53 (2010).
36 Lynn M. Squillace, Too Much ofA Good Thing: Toward A Regulated Mar-
ket in Human Eggs, 11 HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. no.2,2005, at 143-44 (2005).
Melissa Boatman, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland MustAdopt an Equitable
Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L.
REV. 285, 308-14 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood's Influence:
Rethinking Procreative Autonomy and Federal Paternity Establishment Policy,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 489,495 (2012)
3S Sarah Abramowicz, Contractualizing Custody, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 67,
121 (2014).
3 Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Amy Fiordalisi, Toward Gender Equality:
The Promise of Paradoxes of Gender to Promote Structural Change, 1 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 31, 139 (1994) (book review).
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to be implanted with those eggs themselves, as egg donors. 40 Many
of these women, however, are not purely egg donors. They do not
give eggs to be used by a stranger. Rather, they allow the use of
their eggs in an IVF procedure performed on their female roman-
tic partner.4 1 The egg contributor in these cases is both a biologi-
cal and intended mother of the resulting child.42 Still, most states
would not presume the woman contributing the eggs to be the legal
mother of the child.43 Again, most states recognize only the woman
giving birth to the child as that child's legal mother.4 4 The scenario
outlined above, however, cries out for an exception to the general
rule and warrants a recognition of the parental rights of the biolog-
ical and intended mother. At least two states have created such an
exception. 45 The vast majority, however, have not.46
One of the most significant obstacles to providing appropri-
ate recognition of maternal rights in the aforementioned context is,
quite simply, terminology. The law has generally labeled all arrange-
ments whereby a woman allows her eggs to be used by another
woman in reproduction as egg donation. "Colloquially speaking,"
a woman who provides eggs for reproduction, with the gestation to
be undertaken by her partner "donates" the eggs to her partner.47
"Yet such a characterization is loaded with inapplicable nuances,
which should not be determinative of parental rights. Advances in
reproductive technologies have antiquated the once-precise termi-
nology of donor." 48 Historically, a donor of male or female gametes
for reproduction was one who provided gametes (typically anon-
ymously) with no attendant rights to parent the resulting child.
Donors usually did not expect to or wish to parent the children
created with the aid of their gametes and, indeed, were typically
required at the time of the donation to execute writings relinquish-
ing all parental rights in the resulting children. 49
4 Lynda Wray Black, The Birth of a Parent: Defining Parentage for Lenders




44 See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714,733 (Tenn. 2005).
45 K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320
(Fla. 2013).
46 In re Adoption of A.F.C., 491 S.W.3d 316,322 (Tenn. Ct.App.2014) (read-
ing Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-102 to define mother as "the woman who produced
the 'live birth"'); For an example of a court recognizing an intended mother as
the legal mother of the child, see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P2d 776, 778 (1993).
47 Black, supra note 40, at 816.
4S Id.
49 Id.
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As one scholar has noted, "true donation" is distinct from the
"intentional lend[ing] of procreative genetic material."0 Yet family
law continues to treat the situations as synonymous, and the conse-
quences of the law's failure to adequately adapt are drastic for the
egg lender. As donors, egg lenders are deemed to have irrevocably
parted with their gametes, "relinquish[ing] to the donee all present
and future dominion and control over [them]."" In this modern egg
lending context, a genetic mother is deprived of the right to parent
her offspring, even in the face of a willingness, a competence, and
the shared intention of all parties involved for her to do so.
Furthermore, women lending eggs without donative intent is
not a rare occurrence. American families are changing rapidly, and
a multitude of states have already been faced with cases involving
almost precisely the same facts.52
States' parentage statutes did not originate from an intent to
deny intended mothers and egg lenders parental rights. That out-
come is an outgrowth of a historical relic of family law-the notion
that the only woman who can have a legal maternal connection with
a child is the woman who has given birth to the child. And while
that rule may have made sense a century ago, times have changed.53
Today, the continuation of a filiation scheme that wholly refuses to
recognize the intentional and genetic connection between a child
and an intentional egg lender is unjustifiable.
Such a set of rules treats the sexes inequitably. "Current
parentage statutes provide several means by which an intended
father can establish parentage; however, these statutes are often
gender-specific and, consequently, not equally applicable to wom-
en as a means of establishing parental rights."54 The law regulat-
ing intentional egg lending is, by definition, sexist and disrespects
women's reproductive decisions. The failure to honor the wishes of
two women, both intimately involved in the reproductive process,
renders their procreative choices meaningless. That result would be
troubling no matter the circumstances, but the fact that American
law generally refuses to recognize an intention-based maternal link
5o Id.
51 Id.
52 See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); D.M.T.v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320
(Fla. 2013); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Tenn. 2005).
See generally Magdalena Duggan, Mater Semper Certa Est, Sed Pater In-
certus? Determining Filiation of Children Conceived via Assisted Reproductive
Techniques: Comparative Characteristics and Visions for the Future, 4 IRISH J. OF
LEGAL STUD., no. 1, 2014 (discussing the history of maternal filiation).
54 Id.
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even for women biologically related to the child at issue crosses
into a truly disturbing realm.
Courts and legislatures alike must rethink filiative rules, recog-
nizing that not all "egg donors" are truly donors. Acknowledging a
more nuanced possibility, given modern reproductive technologies,
would serve to empower women and to provide the much-needed
respect for the procreative decisions that the law currently lacks
altogether. It is nearly impossible to claim that children would suf-
fer from a legal scheme that recognized their ties to a woman who
is both a genetic and intentional parent. Additionally, the societal
benefit of empowering women by affirming the worthiness of their
reproductive choices is simply inestimable.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: PUNISHMENT WITHOUT POSITIVITY?
Among the more popular directions of state domestic vio-
lence legislation has been a push towards making punitive damages
awardable in domestic violence cases. By both lifting the prohibi-
tion on suits between spouses and expressly providing for punitive
damages, states have simultaneously moved to both eliminate the
historical barriers to suit faced by victims of spousal abuse and to
incentivize victims of domestic violence to act. These incentives are
likely to prove effective in encouraging more domestic violence vic-
tims to sue under these more liberal procedural and substantive
statutory standards. But there is little reason to believe that such an
outcome better serves the victims of domestic violence. An increase
in litigation between the victims and perpetrators of domestic vio-
lence is likely to create substantial negative effects in terms of
female empowerment.
A. Paving the Path Through Punitive Damage Legislation
Historically, the availability of punitive damages in the domes-
tic violence context was a nonissue. At common law, all spouses
were prohibited from suing one another, due to the interspousal
bar to suit." Great concern over the propriety of judicial involve-
ment in the business of an ongoing family unit convinced judges
and legislators alike that disputes between married persons were
best situated out of the courtroom.56 As a result, interspousal suits
were, at one time, impermissible in every state. 7
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910).
56 Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ohio 1985) (citing the general
public policy that courts should not interfere with the family as the rationale
behind intrafamily immunity, but abrogating interspousal immunity nonethe-
less).
" After its recognition in America in the 1860s, interspousal immunity en-
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Courts and legislatures around the country began to question
the continuing propriety of the interspousal bar to suit in the early
1920s.8 Finding the traditional public policy reasons for adhering to
the doctrine-including adherence to the legal fiction of a husband
and wife as a single person, avoiding disruption of the family, and
discouraging collusive schemes to exploit insurance policies-no
longer held, states began to abolish the doctrine entirely.5 9
In a 1993 decision abolishing interspousal immunity, for
instance, the Florida Supreme Court remarked that:
We [previously] held that the doctrine of interspousal
immunity no longer is applicable when the public pol-
icy reasons for applying it do not exist. Based on this
holding, we found .. . that the doctrine did not bar a
wife's claim filed against the insurer of a deceased hus-
band when the factual claim before us arose from the
same accident in which the husband died and when the
claim did not exceed the limits of liability. Since [that
decision] was issued, this Court and its advisory com-
missions have had an opportunity to review legal issues
joyed nationwide application for the next fifty years. Carl Tobias, Interspousal
Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 359 (1989).
1 Early on, some states made exceptions to immunity for violent and will-
ful tortious acts perpetrated by husbands against their wives. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Johnson, 77 So. 335 (Ala. 1917) (allowing wife to sue her husband for assault
and battery); Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 186 S.W. 832 (Ark. 1916) (permitting wrong-
ful death suit brought by wife against husband); Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889
(Conn. 1914) (allowing interspousal suit for battery and false imprisonment);
Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657 657 (N.H. 1915) (interpreting Pub.St.1901, c. 176,
§ 2 to authorize suit by wife against husband for assault); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 140
P 1022, 1025 (Okla. 1914) (reading state constitution and statutes to allow re-
covery to a wife for injuries maliciously and feloniously inflicted upon her by a
husband, but asserting that the right did not allow her to claim exemplary dam-
ages for mental anguish or humiliation). Other states removed the bar for neg-
ligent torts, but only in the case of automobile accidents. See Bushnell v. Bush-
nell, 131 A. 432 (Conn. 1925); Pardue v. Pardue, 166 S.E. 101 (S.C. 1932).
5 Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d
70 (Cal. 1962); Rains v. Rains, 46 P2d 740 (Colo. 1935); Rogers v. Yellowstone
Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (Idaho 1975); Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind.
1972); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Hosko v. Hosko, 187 N.W.2d
236 (Mich. 1971); Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969); Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963); Maestas v. Overton, 531 P2d 947
(N.M. 1975); Jacobs v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 152 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1956);
Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932); Courtney v. Courtney, 87
P2d 660 (Okla. 1938); Prosser v. Prosser, 102 S.E. 787 788 (S.C. 1920); Scot-
vold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266 (S.D. 1941); Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200
(Va. 1971); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972), overruled by Brown v.
Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984); ARK.STATS. § 55-401 (1947).
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relevant to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. As a
result of that review, we now find that there no longer
is a sufficient reason warranting a continued adherence
to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. As we previ-
ously have held, the common law will not be altered
or expanded by this Court unless demanded by public
necessity or to vindicate fundamental rights. Here, we
find that both public necessity and fundamental rights
require judicial abrogation of the doctrine.60
In that case, the court acknowledged that Florida had been
"in a shrinking minority" in persisting with interspousal immunity,
as thirty-two states had already abrogated the doctrine entirely.61
Today, that minority is smaller still, with only six states continu-
ing to recognize immunity.62 And even in those few states retaining
immunity, a myriad of exceptions to the rule essentially render it a
toothless anachronism.63
On the heels of the abrogation of interspousal immunity
came the subsequent creation of a cause of action for "continuing
domestic violence," a statutory tort legitimizing the claims of the
victims of domestic violence and solving the limitation problems
60 Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993).
61 Id.
62 Interspousal immunity is still recognized in Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Georgia, Nevada.
63 O'Grady v. Potts 396 P.2d 285 (Kan. 1964) (permitting suit during mar-
riage for premarital tort); Barnes v. Barnes, 08-492, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09);
8 So. 3d 628, 631 (finding interspousal immunity inapplicable to shareholder
derivative actions); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993) (holding
actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress through physical violence
and accompanying verbal abuse between spouses not barred by interspousal
immunity); Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 (Me.1973) (finding interspousal
immunity did not bar action for conduct prior to marriage but did bar action for
conduct occurring during marriage); Bedell v. Reagan, 192 A.2d 24 (Me. 1963)
(allowing third-party action for contribution from a joint tortfeasor husband
who, because of the concept of interspousal immunity, could not be directly
sued by the injured wife); Bearden v. Bearden, 499 S.E.2d 359,361 (Ga. Ct.App.
1998) (abrogating the immunity where there is no marital harmony or unity to
preserve and where there is no possibility of collusion); Rupert v. Stienne, 528
P2d 1013 (Nev. 1974) (abrogating interspousal immunity regarding claims aris-
ing out of motor vehicle accidents); Pearce v. Boberg, 510 P2d 1358 (Nev. 1973)
(permitting suit between spouses during marriage for premarital tort); Campo
v. Taboada, 720 P2d 181 (Haw. 1986) (interspousal tort immunity does not pre-
vent filing third-party claim for contribution against wife of plaintiff). See also
Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d at 1361 (Fla. 1993) ("[T]he very act of creating excep-
tions to the doctrine, as this Court repeatedly has done, renders the doctrine in-
creasingly less justifiable.").
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that frequently plagued their claims.6 4 With the bar to suit lifted,
an express recognition of their right to sue, and a distinct statutory
basis for recovery, domestic violence victims finally had the poten-
tial to hold their abusers accountable in tort, a development recog-
nized as long in the making and highly desirable.65
Along with the extension of private tort claims to the vic-
tims of domestic violence, however, a more questionable trend
has emerged. Victims are statutorily entitled to compensatory
awards, injunctions, costs, and even attorneys fees; but now courts
are increasingly granting these in conjunction with a form of dam-
ages not previously contemplated in the domestic violence con-
text: punitives.66
64 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(1) (West Supp. 2017); 2002 Cal. ALS 193.
65 See Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1247 (7th Cir. 1984) (asserting that it
would strain the imagination "to find some objective basis for believing that
depriving a physically battered spouse of a civil remedy for her injuries will
advance some sense of 'harmony' with the person who inflicted the injury").
For scholarly support of particularized domestic violence torts, see Rhonda
L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Woman and Tort Law:A New Approach to
Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (1992) (arguing that
"the courts and legislatures should recognize a new tort of spousal abuse which
would facilitate compensating women for mental and physical injuries inflicted
by battering domestic partners"). Kohler recommends that courts recognize a
continuing tort of spousal abuse using the following elements: "(1) intention-
al acts; (2) of extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) of a continuous nature; (4)
proximately causing; (5) physical injury or emotional distress." Id. at 1068. See
also Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Ob-
stacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV.
945, 1019-25 (2004) (arguing for recognition of a domestic violence tort and
describing the benefits of a specially designated domestic violence tort); Clare
Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possi-
bilities, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 319, 344-46 (1997) (proposing a new tort of "part-
ner abuse," incorporating "the entire history of combined physical and emo-
tional abuse [into] a single claim"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies,
and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525,
2566-67 (1994) (proposing a new "claim for marital tort or breach of spousal
trust," providing recovery for "physical, emotional, and economic injuries flow-
ing from a spouse's misconduct," and acknowledging "a person's right to be free
from egregious conduct related to sex and gender and to abuse of power in the
home"); Melissa I Pefla, Note, The Role of Appellate Courts in Domestic Vio-
lence Cases and the Prospect of a New Partner Abuse Cause ofAction, 20 REV.
LITIG. 503, 523-26 (2001) (proposing that state appellate courts adopt a cause
of action for "partner abuse" which would "permit the victim to recover for all
injuries occurring [throughout] the battering relationship").
66 See, e.g., Cater v. Cater, 846 S.W. 173 (Ark. 1993) (wife recovered $20,000
compensatory and $350,000 punitive damages for assault and battery); Alder-
son v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 612-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (plaintiff who
cohabited with her boyfriend for twelve years was awarded $15,000 in compen-
satory damages and $4,000 in punitive damages for assault and battery for in-
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Of course, tort litigants are no strangers to punitive damages.
For more than two hundred years, courts have awarded them as an
aid to accomplishing the goals of tort litigation.67 Punitive damages
incentivize bringing claims that may otherwise be deemed unwor-
thy of litigation given the relatively low reward of a pure loss-based
recovery, and they offer rewards to plaintiffs for the public service
of bringing a wrongdoer to justice.68 But most importantly, they pun-
ish tortfeasors in the hopes of deterring abhorrent conduct.69 Many
torts scholars have lauded the effectiveness of punitive damages.70
And strong evidence indicates that they generally accomplish their
objectives." Punitive damages provide a powerful incentive against
juries sustained when her boyfriend broke her arm); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622
A.2d at 1138,1144 (Me. 1993) (awarding $75,000 in compensatory damages and
$40,000 in punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Adam M. v. Christina B., No. S-14569, 2013 LEXIS 73, at *19 (Alaska June 5,
2013) (affirming trial court's award of $500,000 in punitive damages on tort
claim joined with a divorce action, but asserting abuse of discretion in levying
attorneys costs and fees related to the divorce action).
67 Punitive damages were awarded in the United States as early as 1784.
Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784). While punitive damages were a
rarity in early American judicial decisions, the mid- to late-1900s witnessed a
noted spike in their frequency in civil suits. A 2005 report issued by the Depart-
ment of Justice found that 12 percent of all plaintiffs bringing civil suit in state
courts sought punitive damages, and 30 percent of those requests were granted.
THOMAS H. COHEN & KYLE HARBACEK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AwARDS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 1 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
pdasc05.pdf.
68 Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1189 (Miss.
1990).
69 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008).
7o Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1392 (1987) (advocating punitive liabili-
ty; David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359
(1998); Brittan I Bush, The Overlooked Function of Punitive Damages, 44 RUT-
GERS L.J. 161 (2014) (arguing that the incentivization function restores social
equity by allowing those who could not otherwise bring a suit to seek redress,
and that in so doing simultaneously meets the goals of punishment and deter-
rence); Margaret Jane Radin, Essay, Compensation and Commensurability, 43
DUKE L.J. 56, 57 (1993); Matthew Parker, Changing Tides: The Introduction of
Punitive Damages into the French Legal System, 41 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 389
(2013) (arguing that punitives also serve a redressability function while carry-
ing out their primary purpose).
71 Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman &
Martin T.Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 1 LEGAL STUD. 623,
650 (1997) (utilizing a regression analysis to establish the predictability and ex-
plicability of punitive damages); John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Com-
parative Analysis, 42 COLUM. I TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 435 (2004) ("Judges and
juries in our system have usually found that moderate awards of punitive dam-
ages, which inevitably carry a stigma in the broader community, are generally
16 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
wrongful behavior and "fill a void where criminal sanctions for such
behavior are few and ineffective." 7 2
It is thus unsurprising that the state-law movement toward
enhancing protections for the victims of domestic violence would
capitalize on tort law's punitive damage concept. Even Congress,
in passing the 2000 version of the Violence Against Women Act,
extended the possibility of a punitive damage recovery to the vic-
tims of "crimes of violence motivated by gender." 73 And while the
Supreme Court held this version of VAWA unconstitutional in 2000
as violative of the Commerce Clause,74 states began to follow suit.
California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and North Dakota
have all made the right of a victim of domestic violence to recover
punitive damages in a suit against her attacker express by statute.7 5
The list of states acting similarly continues to grow, with Louisiana
joining the list in 2014. This demonstrates an unmistakable trend in
which legislatures are taking meaningful steps to address domes-
tic violence. 76
sufficient [to deter misconduct].").
72 Michele M. Jochner, Punitive Damages: The US. Supreme Court's Mean-
dering Path, 83 ILL. B.1576, 577 (1995).
7 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2012). Gender violence in VAWA and numerous
other state statutes, includes both obvious and non-obvious forms of domestic
violence. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2012) ("the term'crime of violence moti-
vated by gender' means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on
the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender; and [. . .] the term 'crime of violence' means-(A) an act or series of
acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a
felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury
to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offens-
es described in section 16 of title 18, whether or not those acts have actually re-
sulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those
acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of
the United States; and (B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute
a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the
person who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is
taken." Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012), "'crime of violence' means- (a) an of-
fense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
cal force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that
is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of commit-
ting the offense.").
7' United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7 CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.4 (West Supp. 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.35 (West
2011); 740 ILL. COMp. STAT. 82/15 (West 2010); LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2315.8 (Supp.
2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11
(2010). New York City has also included a punitives provision in its municipal
code. New York City, N.Y., Code § 8-904 (2016).
76 LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2315.8 (Supp. 2017) ("In addition to general and
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That trend has taken root in the national jurisprudence as
well. Even where there is no express statute, courts in at least twen-
ty states have recognized that domestic violence victims should
recover punitive damages in certain instances.77 The clear trend in
special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the in-
juries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton and reckless dis-
regard for the rights and safety of a family or household member, as defined in
R.S. 46:2132, through acts of domestic abuse ... regardless of whether the de-
fendant was prosecuted for his or her acts.").
77 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1045 (2016) (a court may "[g]rant any other rea-
sonable relief necessary or appropriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of
future domestic violence"); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-5 (LexisNexis 2015) (a
protective order "may provide further relief, as the court deems necessary to
prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence of abuse"); 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/2-1207
(West 2016) (permitting and placing limitations on the assignment of punitive
damages in civil actions); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-510 (LexisNexis 2012)
("[A] petitioner ... is not limited to or precluded from pursuing any other le-
gal remedy."); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-913 (LexisNexis 2013)
("In any action for punitive damages for personal injury, evidence of the defen-
dant's financial means is not admissible until there has been a finding of liability
and that punitive damages are supportable under the facts."); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01 (West Supp. 2017) (a court may "order, in its discretion, other relief as
it deems necessary for the protection of a family or household member"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2016) (a court may "[g]rant other relief that
the court considers equitable and fair"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.4 (West
Supp. 2017) ("[T]he court may impose any terms and conditions in the protec-
tive order that the court reasonably believes are necessary to bring about the
cessation of domestic abuse against the victim or stalking or harassment of the
victim...."); OR. REV. STAT. § 107716 (2015) ("Any proceeding ... shall be in ad-
dition to any other available civil or criminal remedies"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-
15.1-7 (2013) (providing that a victim of domestic abuse "who pursues remedies
under this chapter is not precluded from pursuing other legal or equitable rem-
edies against the respondent"); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-10-5 (2016) (permit-
ting an award of "other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection
of the person to whom relief is being granted"); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.008
(West 2014) ("[T]he relief and remedies provided by this subtitle are cumula-
tive of other relief and remedies provided by law."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-
7-106 (LexisNexis 2012) (allowing a court to "order any further relief that the
court considers necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the petition-
er and any designated family or household member"); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
279.1 (2016) (permitting "[a]ny other relief necessary for the protection of the
petitioner and family or household members of the petitioner"); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-27-503 (LexisNexis 2015) (providing for "any other relief the court
deems necessary to protect the physical safety of petitioner or those persons
for whom a petition may be filed"); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-21-106 (2015) ("The
remedies provided by this act are in addition to any other civil or criminal rem-
edy available to the petitioner," where punitive damages are available in a civ-
il action); P.R. LAws ANN. Trr. 8 § 621(j) (2014) (" [C]ompensation can include,
but shall not be limited to compensation for moving expenses, expenses for the
repair of property, legal expenses, medical, psychiatric, psychological, counsel-
ling, guidance, lodging, housing and other similar expenses, without prejudice
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here is to enable domestic violence victims to capitalize on the ben-
efits of punitive damages as a tool in bringing suit and obtaining
financial independence from their attackers. 8
It is difficult to disagree with this approach, particularly giv-
en the hope it appears to offer domestic violence victims. If puni-
tives have succeeded in tort in general, why can they not succeed in
this context?
B. Potholes Along the Path-the Inability of Punitives to Make
Real Strides Toward Solving the Domestic Violence Problem
Punitives theoretically provide a means of empowering vic-
tims of domestic violence by providing them with cash at a time in
which they are arguably most desperate. To the extent the availabil-
ity of punitive damage recoveries incentivize victims to escape their
attackers, it is difficult to quibble with their availability. The trouble
is that punitive damages are ill-equipped to live up to their promise
in the domestic violence context. They may, indeed, incentivize liti-
gation brought on behalf of the domestic violence victims, but they
do so at a great price. Further, from a pragmatic perspective, both
the timing of the recovery of punitives through the litigation pro-
cess, and the relatively unsympathetic view of juries in this domain,
make punitives an ineffective tool to address domestic violence.
There is every reason to believe that the express availability
of punitive damages in the domestic violence context provides an
incentive for victims to pursue legal action against their attackers. 79
to other civil actions to which the petitioner is entitled."). Adam M. v. Christina
B., No. S-14569, 2013 Alas. LEXIS 73, at *19 (Alaska June 5, 2013) (affirming
trial court's award of $500,000 in punitive damages on tort claim joined with
a divorce action, but asserting abuse of discretion in levying attorneys costs
and fees related to the divorce action); Cater v. Cater, 846 S.W. 173 (Ark. 1993)
(where wife recovered $20,000 compensatory and $350,000 punitive damag-
es for assault and battery); Curtis v. Firth, 850 P2d 749 (Idaho 1993) (awarding
$50,000 in compensatory damages for battery, $225,000 for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and $725,000 in punitive damages); O'Keiff v. Christ,
No.92-28795-A (Dist. Ct. Tex., Apr. 6, 1994). (victim was awarded $10.9 million
in compensatory damages, $150 million in punitive damages, and approximate-
ly $9 million in court costs and interest); In re Brown, 277 S.W.3d 474, 476 (Tex.
App. 2009) (awarding judgment of more than $5.2 million, including $2 million
in punitive damages, to pregnant victim beaten by surgeon husband, causing in-
ducement of premature labor); See also, Carolyn Magnuson, Marital Tort Law-
suits Can Make Abusers Pay, 38 FEB TRIAL 12 (2002).
7 Camille Carey, Domestic Violence Torts: Righting a Civil Wrong, 62 U.
KAN. L. REV. 695,738-39 (2014).
7 See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 E3d 236, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2000); See
also Carey, supra note 78, at 738-89. Accord Symposium, Domestic Violence in
Legal Education and Legal Practice: A Dialogue Between Professors and Prac-
titioners, II J.L. & PoL'Y 409, 457-58 (2003).
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Indeed, that incentive is the very reason victims' advocates have
pressed state legislatures so vigorously to allow for punitives in the
domestic abuse context. 0 Litigant concerns about the relative costs
and benefits of the trial process are substantially assuaged when
punitive damages are a possibility." A once risky cause of action,
with high cost potential, but likely minimal reward-given the lim-
ited nature of compensatories, even considering emotional distress
damages-is likely a significant deterrent to filing suit for domes-
tic violence victims.82 The financial and emotional toll of the litiga-
tion simply is not often offset by the potential return.83 As a result,
the perpetrators of domestic violence almost never face civil legal
action addressed toward compensating the victims of the injuries
they caused.84
The availability of punitives changes the calculus substantial-
ly. The increased reward possibility provides helpful motivation to
pursue a private cause of action against an abuser." And the vic-
tims of domestic violence are not the only persons incentivized.
Lawyers, who may have shied away from such cases for the similar
financial and emotional reasons as their clients, are far more likely to
agree to representation of victims, particularly on a contingent-fee
s Caroline S. Schmidt, What Killed the Violence Against Women Act's Civil
Rights Remedy Before the Supreme Court Did?, 101 VA. L. REV. 501, 523 n.128
(2015) (42 U.S.C §13981(c) "provided for both attorneys' fees and punitive
damages as added incentives for attorneys and plaintiffs.").
sI See, Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 E3d 236, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2000).
Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 E3d 236, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2000).
See Strack v. Strack, 916 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) ("For vic-
tims of domestic violence, the requirement to prove fault and engage in ex-
tensive litigation in what is already a traumatic and dangerous situation adds
an additional burden for women and children caught in domestic abuse situa-
tions.") (quoting Letter from Senator Ruth Hassell-Thompson, August 5, 2010,
at 1, Bill Jacket, L. 2010, ch. 384); Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women
Act and the Construction ofMultiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Fem-
inist Movements, 4 J.L. & PoLY 463, 499-500 (1996); Heather Lauren Hughes,
Contradictions, Open Secrets and Feminist Faith in Enlightenment, 13 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 187, 190-91 (2002); Carey, supra note 78, at 738-39.
84 According to a 1992 study conducted by Douglas D. Scherer, state and
federal courts had only applied a tort theory of recovery in 14 of over 6,000 cas-
es between 1958-1990; only 53 out of 2600 reported state and federal claims for
assault and/or battery occurred between spouses between 1981-1990. Douglas
D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543,
565 (1992). A cursory review of cases between 2000 and 2015 reveal 53 jury ver-
dicts and settlements on tort claims related to domestic violence.
" See Sandra L. Nunn, The Due Process Ramifications of Punitive Dam-
ages, Continued: TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711 (1993), 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029,1036-371037 n.48, 1037-38,1088-89 (1995);
Carey, supra note 78, at 739.
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basis, with the hope of a punitive damage recovery looming.86 Puni-
tive damages have encouraged litigation in other areas of the law
and hopefully will encourage litigation in the domestic violence
context." In short, if the goal of legislators and victims' rights advo-
cates is to incentivize filing civil suits against batterers, allowing the
recovery of punitive damages is effective insofar as it increases both
litigant and lawyer incentives to file suit.
However, while an increase in tort actions would target
perpetrators of domestic violence, a simultaneous boost in vic-
tim independence and empowerment remains unlikely. First, the
punitive damage incentive typically fails to live up to its promise
when domestic violence cases actually come before juries. Juries
award punitive damages more frequently than do judges,89 and
juries rarely get the opportunity to weigh in on damages in today's
settlement-heavy litigation practice.90 But even when they do take
up cases of domestic violence, juries are largely unsympathetic to
86 Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Le-
gal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1416-17 (1993) (" [A]vailable figures com-
pare filings in courts of general jurisdiction in thirteen states for the years 1984
to 1989. During that period, tort filings increased by 26.7%, contract filings in-
creased by 21.6%, and real property rights filings increased by 44.2%.").
1 See Saisiri Siriviriyakul, The Imposition of Punitive Damages: A Com-
parative Analysis (2012) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, University of Il-
linois at Urbana-Champaign, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/han-
dle/2142/32075/Siriviriyakul-Saisiri.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.
cc/55MH-S5RR] (on file with the Graduate College).
" See Galanter & Luban, supra note 86, at 1441-42 (arguing the social util-
ity of the lawyer as bounty hunter).
89 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439
(2001); Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 901 (W.Va. 1991), hold-
ing modified by Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815 (W.
Va. 2010) ("Juries are awarding punitive damages more frequently and in larg-
er amounts."). See also Theodore Eisenberg et. al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive
Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 772 (2002); Francis X.
Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036, 2070 (2013)
("Empirical research has shown ... that punitive damage awards vary signifi-
cantly between bodily and non-bodily injuries (with punitive damages being
awarded by judges less frequently than juries for non-bodily injuries). At the
same time, however, subjects respond with harsher punishments when they are
told in victim impact statements about greater emotional harm experienced by
the victim.").
90 See Herbert Kritzer, The Lawyer as Negotiator: Working in the Shadows
10-13 (Univ. Wis. Law Sch., Disputes Processing Research Program Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 4, 1986) (revealing that, in an analysis of 1649
state and federal cases in five localities, only 7 percent terminated through tri-
al). Indeed, the threat of punitive damages is a primary motivation for many
defendants to settle. See, e.g., Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 644 E Supp. 1289,
1297 (D.D.C. 1986).
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victims' prayers for punitive damages.91 Juries often have a diffi-
cult time contextualizing behavior by domestic violence victims
that appears "maladaptive, illogical, and unstable" as they are often
unaware of the unique dynamics of an abusive relationship and its
psychological effect on the victim. 9 2
Second, a tort claim against a batterer may be financially
beneficial, but remains exceptionally physically and emotionally
dangerous for domestic violence victims, regardless of the outcome
of the case.93 The litigation process is neither quick nor simple,9 4
and incentives to pursue domestic violence litigation must be bal-
anced with the reality that the litigation ties the victim and attacker
together for years.95 Litigation thereby undermines victims' criti-
cal need for financial independence and a clean break from their
attackers, as does the collection of the judgment itself. Even when
91 Symposium, supra note 79, at 448 ("[J]uries are not necessarily sympa-
thetic in the framing of punitive damages in cases including intentional torts
against women as they might be in other contexts.").
92 Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence
Civil Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 45-6 (2000).
93 McAlpine v. Pacarro, 262 P.3d 622, 626 n.15 (Alaska 2011) ("[V]ictims
may 'be afraid to confront [the] abuser in court,... [and may] suffer from psy-
chological effects such as post-traumatic disorder, anxiety, and depression.")
(quoting Lisa Bolotin, Note, When Parents Fight:Alaska's Presumption Against
Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L.REV. 263,
290 (2008)). As the Supreme Court of Ohio noted:
Women who are divorced or separated are at higher risk of assault than
married women. The risk of assault is greatest when a woman leaves
or threatens to leave an abusive relationship. Nonfatal violence often
escalates once a battered woman attempts to end the relationship.
Furthermore, studies in Philadelphia and Chicago revealed that twen-
ty-five percent of women murdered by their male partners were sepa-
rated or divorced from their assailants. Another twenty-nine percent
of women were murdered during the separation or divorce process.
State statutes need to protect women and children during and after
the break-up of relationships because of their continuing, and often
heightened, vulnerability to violence.
Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672, 676-77 (Ohio 1997) (quoting Catherine E
Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801,816 (1993)).
9' Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and Visitation Decisions in Domestic
Violence Cases: Legal Trends, Risk Factors, and Safety Concerns, NAT'L ONLINE
RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 5 (Oct. 2007), http://vawnet.org/
material/child-custody-and-visitation-decisions-domestic-violence-cases-le-
gal-trends-risk-factors [https://perma.cc/H9E6-3WSF]..
95 Id. at 2 (explaining how courts, mental health professionals, and lawyers
can pressure victims to stay tied to their abusers, and that many abusers use the
legal system as a way to maintain contact with and harass their estranged spous-
es).
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a victim succeeds in winning a hefty award of punitives, the collec-
tion process is often lengthy and fraught with substantial animosity
flowing from the tortfeasor.96
This article does not suggest that states return to the archaic
theory of interspousal immunity, that tort suits should not be per-
missible to address domestic violence, or even that states should
refrain from providing punitive damages to the victims of domestic
violence. From an equitable perspective, victims of domestic vio-
lence should have, at a minimum, the right to pursue those claims
just as battered strangers would against their attackers. The article
does argue, however, that special consideration should be given to
the real-world effects of expressly providing for punitives in domes-
tic violence cases. A typical tort victim does not suffer from the
same shame and fear of physical reprisal as a domestic violence vic-
tim when considering litigation. A typical tort victim is not engaged
in a struggle to gain financial independence from the tortfeasor. A
typical tort victim does not need to be assured of little to no future
contact with the tortfeasor. And a typical tort victim does not need
the law to empower her in the way a battered woman does.
Punitives punish.97 Punitives deter.98 And while they can
punish and deter perpetrators equally effectively in the domestic
violence context as they can in the stranger tortfeasor context, the
effect of litigation on victims is not analogous between these con-
texts. Legislators, judges, and academics alike must recognize the
special placement and special needs of domestic violence victims in
the litigation sphere. Such recognition necessitates a reflection on
the reality that providing for punitives for domestic violence vic-
tims fails, in many respects, to empower women. In fact, the poten-
tial for further harm and victimization looms. Legislators' time and
efforts spent curbing the domestic violence crisis may be better
spent rejecting special punitive damage-related statutes. Legisla-
tors should instead search for other ways to help victims achieve
independence that serve to empower them as they move forward in
separating from their attackers.
96 Pefa, supra note 65, at 506-07 ("Admittedly, even if a judgment against
an abuser is not dischargeable in bankruptcy and there is no time limit for col-
lection, not all actions may result in collectible judgments."); See also Jennifer
B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence in the First-Year Torts Curriculum, 54 1 LEGAL
EDUC. 511,521 (2004) ("Given that most people have few assets that can be col-
lected to satisfy a tort judgment, how much of a deterrent is the threat of finan-
cial liability anyway?").
97 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008).
9S [d
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III. SPOUSAL SUPPORT: FURTHERING "HABITUATION TO DEPENDENCY"?
Among the more controversial issues facing family law over
the course of the last two decades has been the desirability of a con-
tinued scheme of permanent, or long-term, spousal support.99 Even
outside the domestic violence context, spousal support schemes
have become a lightning rod of controversy.100 By no means has a
national consensus developed.101 And over the course of the last
several years, this problem has emerged in the domestic violence
arena. As state legislatures have shown an increasing willingness
to use spousal support as a tool in addressing the needs of domes-
tic violence victims, the ties between a troubled spousal support
scheme and aid for domestic violence victims have become con-
cerning. Little thought appears to have been given to the propri-
ety of addressing the financial effects of domestic violence through
spousal support, particularly in light of its significant effect-to per-
petuate a tie between victim and attacker.
A. The State of Spousal Support
Alimony schemes did not always suffer the disparagement
they do today.102 Indeed, until the late 1990s, alimony was a relative-
ly well-accepted, and typical, consequence of divorce.103 That view
was easily cultivated because, historically, the purpose of alimony
was clear. It was "paid only by guilty husbands to innocent wives,"
and essentially acted as "a form of damages: the financial penalty
the law imposed upon husbands as a result of their wrongful conduct
in breaching the permanency clause of the marriage contract .... "104
Of course, spousal support today is a reciprocal obligation,10o but
9 Jennifer L. McCoy, Spousal Support Disorder:An Overview ofProblems
in Current Alimony Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 501, 502 (2005) ("Much con-
troversy surrounds this area of the law-spousal support 'has been a source of
much inconsistency among trial courts, unhappiness among litigants, and con-
flict among critics.' Most family law attorneys agree that spousal support pres-
ents the largest impediment to settling divorces, and support cases are among
the most appealed.") (quoting Megan A. Drefchinski, Comment, Out with the
Old and In with the New: An Analysis of Illinois Maintenance Law Under the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and a Proposal for Its Replacement, 23 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 581, 613 (2003)).
.oo McCoy, supra note 99, at 502.
101Id. at 525.
102 Laura W. Morgan, Current Trends in Alimony Law: Where Are We Now?,
34 FAMILY ADVOCATE 8 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpso-




"0'See Leati v. Leati, No. NNH134054880S, 2014 WL 3360578, at *6 n.3
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still larger changes have occurred in the theoretical underpinnings
of the alimony scheme.
With the advent of nationwide no-fault divorce, husbands
need not be proven to have engaged in any wrongful conduct to
pursue a divorce action or to be saddled with a judgment requir-
ing the payment of alimony.106 Indeed, it is not necessary to assign
blame to either spouse in modern no-fault divorce.107 With no culpa-
ble spouse, the "punishment" purpose for spousal support no lon-
ger exists.10 This fundamental change has shaken the foundation
of the spousal support system.109 Many have suggested eliminating
the entire spousal support scheme in the wake of universal no-fault
divorce. 110 It has nonetheless persisted, with states struggling to
develop a justification for its continued existence."
The most entrenched modern defense of spousal support
regimes is that they can potentially rectify financial imbalances that
frequently result from the dissolution of a marriage.112 The under-
lying assumption is that "when a marriage is dissolved, there are
usually losses associated with it, such as lost employment opportu-
nities, or opportunities to acquire education or training, which lead
to disparities in post-divorce earning capacities."113 Even today,
women suffer more financially in after divorce than do their male
counterparts. 114 When marriage has lulled one spouse into a "habit-
uation to dependency," states have used spousal support as the
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 28,2014).
106 See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-104 (2015); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.001
(2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (2016).
"o
7 See Dickson v. Dickson, 235 S.E.2d 479, 481 (Ga. 1977) ("In a no fault di-
vorce, the assignment of blame is irrelevant. . . .").
l0s See Else v. Else, 367 N.W.2d 701, 704 (Neb. 1985); Thornburgh v. Thorn-
burgh, No.96-050, 1997 WL 33480925, at *3 (N. Mar. I. Nov. 24, 1997).
109 See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault:A Viable Means of Re-Inject-
ing Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605,616 (1996).
"' See, e.g., Jennifer Levitz, The New Art of Alimony, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31,
2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487033992045745057004489
57522 [https://perma.cc/AFV5-YXTS].
. See Mosher v. Mosher, 321 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
112 Wallace v. Wallace, 429 A.2d 232, 241-42 (Md. 1981); Innes v. Innes, 569
A.2d 770, 785 (N.J 1990) (acknowledging statutory provisions introduced "for
the express purpose of eliminating inequities in divorce and alimony statutes
that had worked to the detriment of women"); Kay v. Kay, 339 N.E.2d 143, 147
(N.Y. 1975) (admitting that "in our zeal to correct what may have been inequita-
bly burdensome alimony arrangements and to recognize the selfhood of wom-
en as functioning, independent persons, we would do injustice to the men and
women we seek to treat more equally if we ignored the facts of life.").
113 Morgan, supra note 102.
1 14 See MARCIAA MOBILIA BOUMIL, STEPHEN C. HICKS, JOEL FRIEDMAN & BAR-
BARA EWERT TAYLOR, LAW AND GENDER BIAS IO (EB. Rothman & Co. 1994).
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solution.' Thus, the original punishment motive has largely given
way to a more need-based, disparity-focused approach.116 However,
that shift is by no means universal. Perhaps the most difficult task
facing the legislators and scholars grappling with this issue today is
defending its continued justification in a changing legal, economic,
and social climate. 11 7
In the domestic violence context, the failure of family law
to clearly answer that question has been decidedly problematic.
Female victims of domestic violence, in particular, suffer a great
deal. From a financial perspective alone, "[s]urviving abuse push-
es women into poverty due to health complications, homelessness,
and unemployment. In [one year alone,] the Centers for Disease
Control estimated that victims of intimate partner violence in the
United States lost almost 8 million days of work. Reductions in
days worked generally lead to reductions in pay, leaving victims
even more stressed about their life options."" In short, "economic
dependence may be the single most important reason why women
stay" with an abuser.119
State legislators have not ignored the needs of domestic vio-
lence victims. With limited options, they have generally settled on
spousal support as the primary means of financially aiding victims.
Indeed, spousal support has been described as "the only available
tool for addressing cases" in which economic disparity persists at
divorce, particularly when this economic disparity is tied to fam-
ily violence. 120
The manner in which states have tied spousal support and
domestic violence has varied, but has typically proceeded along
three themes. First, a state may expressly authorize the payment
of spousal support in conjunction with the issuance of a protective
order for domestic violence. 1 2 1 More than thirty-five states have
115 Brett v. Brett, 794 So. 2d 912,917 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
116 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 11-106 (LexisNexis 2016); Carr v.
Carr, 152 P.3d 450, 456 (Alaska 2007); Hutchings v. Hutchings, 250 P3d 324,
327-28 (Okla. 2011).
117 See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases?:An Empir-
ical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 510 (1996).
..s Jill C. Engle, Promoting the General Welfare: Legal Reform to Lift Wom-
en and Children in the United States out ofPoverty, 16 1 GENDER RACE & JusT. 1,
15 (2013).
119 Mugan v. Mugan, 555 A.2d 2,3 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).120Engle, supra note 118, at 35 (quoting Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony The-
ory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271, 272 (2011)).
121 See, e.g., Mugan, 555 A.2d at 2 (ordering respondent to pay petitioner
$120 per week in maintenance as part of a civil protection order); Stroschein v.
Stroschein, 390 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (ordering interim child and spousal sup-
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sanctioned this form of emergency relief. These states recognize
the need of domestic violence victims to receive financial assistance
with as little contact with their attackers as possible.122 For example,
several states authorize wage withholding for the payment of emer-
gency support awards in domestic violence cases in order to limit
the contact between the victim and the abuser.123 Emergency sup-
port issued in connection with a protective order, however, is just
that-emergency support.124 It is typically short-term, and intended
solely to get the recipient through the difficult period immediate-
ly following separation from her attacker.125 Most state legislation
addressing protective orders does not extend support beyond that
brief period.126
Second, some states have attempted to address domestic vio-
lence victims' needs using legislation on permanent spousal support.
port of $1200 per month). In some jurisdictions, catch-all provisions are used in
the absence of a specific statutory authorization for support. See, e.g., Powell v.
Powell, 547 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1988).
122 ALA. CODE§ 30-5-7(a)(5) (2016); ALASKA STAT. §18.66.100(b)(12) (2016);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(4) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)
(6) (2013 & Supp. 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(4) (West Supp. 2017); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(a)(7) (2015); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112A-14(b)(12)
(West Supp. 2016); Iowa Code § 236.5(1)(b)(6) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3107(a)(6) (2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(1)(g) (West 2010); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2136(A)(2) (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 4007(1)(I) (2012);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (LexisNexis 2016); MASS. GEN. LAws ch.
209A, § 3 (2014); MINN. STAT.ANN. § 518B.01(6) (West Supp. 2017); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-15(2)(a)(v) (Supp. 2016); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.050 (West Supp.
2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(2) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(2)
(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(I)(b)(7) (2014); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A)(2) (1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a)(7) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-071-02(4)(e) (2015);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(e) (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
4-60(C)(2) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-10-5(4) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-606(a)(7) (2014); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(b)(ii) (2015).
123 Klein & Orloff, supra note 93, at 1000.
124 OR. REV. STAT. § 411.117 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-112 (2015).
125 See Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding it im-
proper to grant continued maintenance to petitioner in renewed civil protec-
tion order without evidence that she lacked sufficient means to provide for
her reasonable needs); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 673 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (denying spousal support in civil protection order where petitioner
did not show that she lacked sufficient property to provide for her reasonable
needs).
126 Domestic Violence Civil Protection Orders (CPOs) by State, A.B.A.
COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (June 2009), http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/DV CPO Chart 8 2008.authcheckdam.
pdf. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-13-3 (1978). See also Dana Harrington Con-
ner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 339, 382-83 (2014).
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At least five states make domestic abuse a factor that courts are
required to consider when determining whether to award perma-
nent spousal support. 1 27 This evolution in the law has not been
without controversy. When alimony's well-accepted purpose was to
punish a wrongdoing spouse, consideration of marital fault-and
particularly domestic violence-was appropriate. 128 However, the
relevance of marital fault in a more need-based, economic-depen-
dence-focused era of spousal support is questionable at best. 129
Some scholars and victims' advocates have attempted to avoid this
difficulty by emphasizing how domestic violence generally goes
hand-in-hand with an atmosphere of control.130 Domestic violence
victims are more likely to be economically dependent on others
than their non-abused, but otherwise similarly situated, counter-
parts.131 It may well be true that domestic violence is relevant to the
127 CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 112 (Supp.
2017); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-
05-23; R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-16 (Supp. 2016). Four other states provide for con-
sideration of marital misconduct in determining the amount of spousal support.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (2016); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335 (West 2003 & Supp.
2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (2014). Sev-
en other states permit consideration of "any other factor" that a court deems
relevant to an equitable determination of maintenance. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1512(c)(10) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West Supp. 2017); 750 ILL.
COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/504 (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 951-A(5)
(Q) (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150 (LexisNexis Supp. 2016); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-1071 (2016).
128 See DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE
25 (1995). See also Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?": Mar-
riage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877,1889 n.57,
1963 (1999); Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Apply-
ing an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOM-
EN'S L.J. 23, 46 (2001).
129 See Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer, 526 P.2d 762,768 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974)
("Fault has only limited relevance in awarding spousal maintenance....").
"'oSee Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and
Changing Attitudes Toward Female Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 18-19 (2013).
13' One study found that 27 percent of battered women had no access to
cash, 34 percent had no access to a checking account, 51 percent had no access
to charge accounts, and 22 percent had no access to a car. LENORE E. WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 82 (3d ed. 2009). See also Jody Raphael, Bat-
tering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. 1 GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 367 (2003)
("[R]ecent research is demonstrating that many women are unable to comply
with work requirements because of the violence, which makes them even more
economically dependent and places them at greater risk of abuse from their
partners. For example, the Michigan's Women's Employment Study found that
women suffering from persistent domestic violence were almost four times as
likely to be welfare reliant than wage reliant, compared to the women who nev-
er experienced severe domestic violence, and were almost twice as likely to be
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permanent spousal support determination insofar as it is likely to
bolster or provide a reason for the claimant's need. But by making
marital fault (and thereby domestic violence) a factor courts must
consider in determining the propriety and amount of a permanent
spousal support award, state legislatures have effectively sanc-
tioned its consideration in all cases. Even financially independent
victims of spousal support are entitled to a consideration of marital
fault, bringing the archaic punishment purpose of spousal support
back to the forefront.
One argument justifying this development relies on the need-
based limitation of modern spousal support. 13 2 For example, even
if a court ordered a large spousal support award after due consid-
eration of domestic violence throughout the course of a marriage,
state law would prevent the court from doing so if the victim was
not financially needy.133 Moreover, marital fault is just one factor
in a complicated spousal support analysis. Therefore, the consider-
ation of domestic violence as a factor in the spousal support eval-
uation does not necessarily mean that permanent support will be
ordered.134 Still, the mandatory domestic violence factor in a per-
welfare reliant as those who never experienced domestic violence.").
132 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 891-92 (1992) ("Psychologi-
cal abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common. Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps
because they perceive no superior alternative. Many abused women who find
temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they
have no other source of income.") (internal citations omitted). See also LENORE
E.WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 28 (3d ed. 2009).
133 See Kunkle v. Kunkle, 554 N.E.2d 83, 84 (Ohio 1990) (prohibiting the
court from using alimony as a means to fine, penalize, or reward either party);
Campbell v. Campbell, 244 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ohio Ct. App. 1968) ("There is no
question in this case that the husband's treatment of his wife warranted ... a di-
vorce on the grounds of cruelty, but there is absolutely no evidence to support
the court's allowance of $5,000 alimony. . . . [H]e has no assets, nor was there
any evidence of earning capacity with which to pay. This was nothing more than
a fine, and to levy it was an abuse of discretion for which this court must re-
verse.").
13 See In re Marriage of Geraci, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 248-51 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (finding a trial court abused its discretion in making a spousal support or-
der based on some of the statutory factors without considering all of them and
stating how they applied to the order); In re Marriage of Smith, 274 Cal. Rptr.
911, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("Determining the weight to be given each of the
statutory factors in a particular case, in order to arrive at a "just and reason-
able" support award is extraordinarily difficult. It is a matter committed to the
trial court's sound discretion."); In re Marriage of Baker 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 553,
556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) ("The court possesses broad discretion in balancing all
of the applicable factors. . . . Considering the myriad of factual circumstances
which the trial court must consider ... it is the rare case ... where a court is duty
bound to exercise its discretion in only one way.").
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manent spousal support determination hearkens back to the days in
which spouses-typically husbands-were ordered to pay hefty and
permanent alimony as a punishment for their marital misdeeds.135
In attempting to aid the victims of domestic violence, many state
legislatures, perhaps unwittingly, have revived that historical, pun-
ishment-focused rationale for spousal support.
Generally, such a course of action is somewhat troubling if not
reconciled with the broader themes of permanent spousal support
and its purpose. But one state has taken an even more aggressive,
more disturbing, third approach. In 2014, Louisiana became the
first state to mandate an award of permanent spousal support for
domestic violence victims.136 Louisiana's statute provides that:
When a spouse has not been at fault prior to the fil-
ing of a petition for divorce and the court determines
that party was the victim of domestic abuse committed
during the marriage by the other party, that spouse shall
be awarded final periodic support or a lump sum award,
at the discretion of the court, in accordance with Para-
graph C of this Article. 13 7
This statute became law as part of a package of legislation
designed to make a concrete effort at addressing Louisiana's domes-
tic violence crisis.138 The package included the creation (for the first
time in Louisiana) of an immediate, fault-based ground for divorce
for abuse, an express approval of punitive damages for domestic
violence victims, and protective order procedure modifications.
These provisions are all tailored to aid the victims of domestic vio-
lence in separating from their attackers.13 9
The statute, originally conceived of by a victims' rights arm
of United Way,140 suffers from some relatively obvious, and in some
cases severe, drafting problems. Yet, in a move uncharacteristic in
135 See, e.g., In re Spencer, 23 P 395, 396 (Cal. 1890) (asserting that alimony
"is something more, and something which the legislature had a right to autho-
rize, and the court to grant, -compensation for a wrong done to [the wife]");
Pauly v. Pauly, 34 N.W. 512,513 (Wis. 1887) ("The respondent was compelled to
fly from his cruelty and tyranny to save herself and her child from injury ... Al-
imony in such a case is in the nature of damages or compensation for the injury,
and for the abused wife's physical and mental sufferings. . .
1 36 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 112 (Supp. 2017).
137 Id.
13SLauren McGaughy, New Orleans Lawmakers TakeAaim at Louisiana
Domestic Violence Problem, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:39 PM),
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the Louisiana legislature, no one spoke to oppose or otherwise cri-
tique the draft. 41 It passed into law with widespread support and
little criticism, constructive or otherwise.1 42
In the aftermath of its adoption, the legal community in Lou-
isiana is struggling to make sense of a severely flawed statute. 143
Questions have arisen, for instance, about the extent to which need
must still be proved. 144 First, did the legislature intend a mandato-
ry support award, even in cases in which the claimant spouse does
not suffer from an economic dependency sufficient to render her
"needy"? Drafting ambiguities have made the answer to that ques-
tion unclear. Second, perhaps more significantly, to what does the
"at the discretion of the court" language refer? 145 Is a court required
under this statute to render an award of permanent spousal support
in all domestic violence cases, with its only discretion as to whether
to award the support as a lump sum or in installments? Or is the "at
the discretion of the court" language intended to make the entire
provision precatory? This intent would clearly conflict with the
plain language "shall," which seems to require an order of support.
The legislation is so new that these questions of interpreta-
tion have not yet worked their way through the judicial system. 146
States desiring to adopt a mandatory scheme of spousal support for
domestic violence victims would do well to pay close attention and
learn from Louisiana's mistakes.
B. Subjugating Women Through Support
Drafting inadequacies are not, however, the most significant
flaw of Louisiana's domestic violence-related support legislation.
The most significant ill perpetrated by such statutes, in Louisiana
and elsewhere, is that they fail to empower the women they seek to
aid. Regardless of the form of the legislation, incentivizing victims
141 Lauren McGaughy, Senate approves immediate divorce, punitive damag-
es for domestic violence victims: Snapshot, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (Apr. 1, 2014,
6:40 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/domestic violence-
divorcejloui.html [https://perma.cc/7Z6U-E7JL].
142 Bill Tracking, La. S.B. 292 2014 Reg. Sess. No. 40 (passing House vote with
ninety-six yeas and zero nays; passing Senate vote with thirty-five yeas and zero
nays).
14 3 See ROBERT C. LOWE, Determination of Final Periodic Support, 1 LA.
PRAc. DIVORCE § 8:162 (2015) ("[T]he amendment is no paragon of clarity and
will doubtless foster much litigation").
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. No court-reported decisions dating from February 2014 address the
new amendments.
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of domestic violence to seek permanent spousal support links them
to their attackers and to further undermine their self-worth.
Much like domestic violence-related punitive damage pro-
visions, the fundamental problem with mandatory spousal sup-
port awards, or even with using domestic violence as a factor in
the spousal support determination at all, is that such measures
incentivize women to seek support. Indeed, that is precisely what
these state statutes are designed to do. More victims of domestic
violence should be incentivized to leave their attackers. And more
victims of domestic violence should be financially aided in making
that decision in light of state statutes providing, with near certainty,
their right to spousal support. The short term success of this form
of legislation is promising. But in the long term, the likely effects
of tying together spousal support and domestic violence are much
more troubling.
The most significant problem with linking domestic violence
and spousal support is that, despite the beginnings of a shift in fam-
ily law, spousal support remains largely permanent.147 Short-term,
rehabilitative support is trendy, and most states now permit judg-
es to order it.148 But it is most certainly not the default scheme. 149
We remain wed to a system of spousal support whereby a one-time
marriage generally obligates the payor to compensate the claimant
perpetually, or at least until death or the claimant's remarriage. 10
In Virginia, for instance, spousal support "must be permanent [ ... ];
limited duration support is error as a matter of law.""' Spousal sup-
port thus remains a largely permanent arrangement.
147 Morgan, supra note 102; Brett R. Turner, Spousal Support in Chaos, 25
FAM. ADVOC. 14, 18 (2003).
148 See Mark A. Fine & David R. Fine, An Examination and Evaluation of
Recent Changes in Divorce Laws in Five Western Countries: The Critical Role of
Values, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 249, 254 (1994); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms
and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901,1970, (2000).
149 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 208, § 49 (2014) (recognizing general alimony
first and then three residual short-term alternatives to be applied where appro-
priate); Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538, 538-39 (Fla. 1985) (rebuking the dis-
trict court's assertion that permanent alimony "should be the last resort rather
than the first" for attempting to "significantly modify the guidelines which we
established in prior decisions for the award of permanent alimony"); Herring
v. Herring, 335 S.E.2d 366, 368 (S.C. 1985) (finding rehabilitative evidence ap-
propriate only in limited circumstances). See also Marshal S. Willick, A Univer-
sal Approach to Alimony: How Alimony Should Be Calculated and Why, 27 1
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 153, 168 (2015) (acknowledging no clear criteria dis-
tinguishing between short-term and permanent alimony awards in state courts
within the same jurisdiction).
o See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 208, § 49 (2014).
151 Laura W. Morgan, Current Trends in Alimony Law: Where Are We Now?,
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That permanence is controversial enough when analyzed in
a vacuum. When considered in the domestic violence context, its
problems become even more stark. Much like punitive damages,
permanent spousal support ties victims and attackers together on
an ongoing basis. States have taken steps to allow for the payment
of spousal support awards in a manner that does not reveal the vic-
tim's address to the attacker.152 But even these protective measures
cannot diminish the consequent tie of victim and attacker in the
permanent support context.153 Even under a mandatory spousal
support scheme, like Louisiana's, the amount of the support award
must be based on a consideration of the claimant's need, the cir-
cumstances surrounding her living situation, details of her employ-
ment, and other intimate personal matters.15 4 Moreover, that inqui-
ry is not a one-time occurrence. Rather, because spousal support
awards are generally permanent, they must be modified over time.
Modifications require repeated inquiries into the victim's current
living situation."' In the wake of an award of permanent spou-
A.B.A. (Apr. 2012), (http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsoloere-
port/2012/april 2012/current trends alimony_1aw.html; (discussing VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-1071 (2016)). See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 498 S.E.2d 461 (Va. Ct. App.
1998).
152 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/112A-5 (West 2006) N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 154-b (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1155 (2010).
153 In re Marriage of Freitas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 460 (2012) (citing As-
sem. Com. on Judiciary, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1221, (2001-2002
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2001, p. 3, which stated that "[S]pousal sup-
port orders in such domestic violence cases potentially force victims of abuse
to remain dangerously entangled in the abuser's web of violence and intimida-
tion."). See also Rebecca Licavoli Adams, California Eviction Protections for
Victims of Domestic Violence: Additional Protections or Additional Problems?,
9 HASTINGs RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 22 (2012) ("Alternatively, many victims want
nothing more than to sever all ties with their abusers. . . ."); Paula Roberts,
Pursuing Child Support for Victims of Domestic Violence, in BATTERED WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM: THE TIES THAT BIND 59, 60 (Ruth A. Brand-
wein ed., 1999) (stating that the pursuit of child support by battered mothers
can increase the violence); Ann Charon Harrington, Commonwealth v. Finase:
The Scope of Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Order Prosecution and Efficacy,
29 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 193,217 (2003) (discussing poten-
tial dangers when an abuser attempts to maintain a relationship with the victim
through contact after the victim has tried to sever all ties).
154 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 112 (Supp. 2017); King v. King, 48,881 (La. App. 2
Cir. 2/26/14); 136 So. 3d 941, 950.
155 See In re Marriage of Holmes, No. H024427 2003 WL 21399774, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2003) (explaining the frequent fluctuations in support
awards due to husband's waxing and waning employment history); In re Mar-
riage of Rohde-Giovanni v. Baumgart, 676 N.W.2d 452, 462-63 (Wis. 2004)
("While a change in circumstances regarding the support objective of mainte-
nance frequently gives rise to parties' motions for modification, it is important
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sal support in the domestic violence context, the attacker spouse
would have a right to inquire into details surrounding the victim's
continuing living situation.156 Because most states have adopted a
"live-in lover" rule terminating spousal support when the recipient
lives in a meretricious relationship with another,1 7 the attacker will
have the legal right to dig into the claimant's sexual activity for
years to come.' He may inject himself, through the use of the liti-
gation process, into her financial and employment affairs, and into
any other sphere bearing on need.159 While the attacker's ability to
manipulate the litigation process is limited by statutes addressing
frivolous or harassing claims, these limits are likely to be of little
comfort to a recovering victim of domestic violence. 16 0
Even absent any nefarious motive, in the best of circum-
stances, permanent spousal support awarded to a victim of domes-
tic violence ties her to her attacker perpetually. Such an outcome
undermines the very purpose of domestic violence victims' legisla-
tion-to provide these women with the financial means for making
a clean break from their attackers.
Moreover, permanent financial support for the victims of
domestic violence -particularly when mandated- undermines
the very independence and empowerment these women strive to
achieve and so desperately need. One of the most documented and
severe harms of domestic violence is its subjugation of the victim to
the attacker.161 Often, through abusive control, the victim is cabined
into an inferior relationship role, and made to feel worthless and
to note that a court reviewing a previous award of maintenance must not solely
limit its inquiry to the support objective. The objective of fairness also must be
considered, even in postdivorce proceedings.").
156 See, e.g., Wikstrom v.Wikstrom, 359 N.W.2d 821,826 (N.D. 1984); Beem v.
Beem, No. 02A01-9511-CV-00252, 1996 WL 636491, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
5,1996).
17 GA. CODE ANN. §19-6-19 (2015 & Supp. 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 134
(2011 & Supp. 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-170 (2014).
Iss See Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 158 (Okla. 1983) (Simms, dissenting)
(decrying Oklahoma's live-in lover statute for infringing on wife's privacy and
depriving her benefits on the grounds of sexual conduct carried out in her own
home).
159 See In re Marriage of Madden, 167 Wash. App. 1039, at *6 (2012) (affirm-
ing trial court's finding that abusive husband had used "litigation as a weapon"
by filing "baseless motions, meritless appeals, and abusive discovery requests").
160 See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-7-80-81 (2000 & Supp. 2016); IND. CODE
§ 34-52-1-1 (LexisNexis 2016); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-14.5 (LexisNexis
2016); N.J STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1 (West 2015).
161 See Lynda Gorov, Male Sense of "Owning" Women Blamed in Abuse,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7,1993, at 1.
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dependent. 16 2 Permanent spousal support only serves to reinforce
those negative feelings. It relies on a public statement-through a
judicial officer-that the recipient is unable to provide for her own
support and, in fact, is dependent on others.163 That message is trou-
bling enough, but spousal support legislation goes a step further,
deeming the victim incapable of self-support. Only one person is,
thereafter, charged with the duty to help-the former spouse/attack-
er. Permanent spousal support awards in the domestic violence con-
text simply serve to underscore the messages of dependence and
lack of empowerment already looming large in the domestic vio-
lence context.
Of course, this article does not suggest that victims of domes-
tic violence should be unable to recover spousal support, or that
they should be subject to temporal limitations on support that do
not govern other spousal support claimants. Rather, it calls for state
legislators and scholars to step back and think critically about the
effect of spousal support rules in this particular context. As women
who have suffered from the inability to attain independence and
control over their own circumstances, victims of domestic violence
arguably need empowering more than others. Lawmakers should
tailor domestic violence-related legislation, as it relates to family
law, in a way that achieves empowerment for victims. Simply plug-
ging the victims of domestic violence into an existing spousal sup-
port framework, given its indefinitely continuing nature, perhaps
should be rejected. Other financial means of incentivizing women
to leave their attackers, which do not simultaneously tie the victim
and attacker together perpetually, must also be explored. In other
words, domestic violence victims are long overdue a careful consid-
eration of all economic mechanisms states may be able to employ
best to empower them. 16 4
162 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED
WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1 (1982); JOHN STUART MILL, THE
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 11 (1861).
163 See Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custo-
dy, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 901 (1998)
("These societally imposed roles ensured the continued economic subjugation
of women by requiring their dependence on men for economic survival, follow-
ing divorce in the forms of alimony and child support, as social etiquette de-
manded that mothers not work."); Rebecca E. Silberbogen, Does the Dissolu-
tion of Covenant Marriages Mirror Common Law England's Subordination of
Women?, 5 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207 235 (1998).
1 Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1316 n. 298
(2008) (recognizing property division as "an important form of reparation-at-
tending to the harm done by one partner to the other, without attempting to re-
pair the actual relationship"). Courts have avoided continuing ties to the abuser
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IV. MARITAL PROPERTY: LABOR CONTRIBUTIONS
OVER HUMAN CAPITAL
Long recognized as an area of family law in which great
strides in women's rights have been made,165 one might expect
marital property, in the entire scheme of family law, to be rather
advanced in terms of female empowerment. Indeed, the very gene-
sis of the community property regime-still the prevailing property
regime in nine American states1 66- was an attempt to recognize a
by awarding a greater portion of the marital estate to the victim of domestic vi-
olence. See, e.g., DeSilva v. DeSilva, No. 350818/05,2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2489,
at *46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 2006) (finding that domestic violence is egregious
marital conduct that is relevant to distribution of marital estate and which jus-
tifies awarding wife an unequal share of the estate). See also Milton C. Regan,
Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2303, 2306-07 (1994) ("Until the last two decades or so, divorce law implic-
itly chose to treat ex-spouses as spouses, albeit with qualifications and reserva-
tions. The result was that, at least formally, men were potentially liable for sup-
porting their ex-wives and women were eligible to receive financial assistance
from their ex-husbands, as if marital rights and obligations continued after di-
vorce. In the past twenty-five years, divorce law has changed . . . [and] adopt-
ed a model that has the effect of treating ex-spouses primarily as strangers. The
emphasis has been on a 'clean break' between the partners, effectuated by a
one-time division of marital assets and restrictions on ongoing financial obliga-
tions .... This approach has not, however, prevented considerable financial dis-
tress at divorce for many women."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-101(a)-(b) (Lex-
isNexis 2015) (recognizing the ongoing violence victims may experience and
the elevated danger at the point of separation, the legislature desired to create
a "speedy remedy to discourage violence against family or household mem-
bers with whom the perpetrator of domestic violence has continuing contact");
Huntington, supra note 164, at 1316 ("In this way, the Reparative Model would
not facilitate the cycle of intimacy through ongoing relationships, but instead
by acknowledging the harm within the person. This recognition would provide
a rationale for funding domestic violence and mental health services. It would
also provide a rationale for a different form of reparation, such as a dispropor-
tionate award of marital property to the victim.").
165 See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION:THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 167 (1988) (" [T]he new laws have planted the seeds
for more equal treatment of women by explicitly recognizing the economic val-
ue of their homemaking and childrearing efforts. It may take many years for
economic opportunities to match the gender neutrality of family law, but those
legal provisions provide a necessary legitimation of women's roles outside the
home."). See also Ronald I Scalise Jr., Undue Influence and the Law ofWills:A
Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE I COMP. & INT'L L. 41,91 (2008) ("American law
has made strides in recent times toward spousal protection. . . .").
166 Axz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 750-755 (West
2004); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2334 (Supp. 2017);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-3-8 (1978); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 2015); Wis. STAT. § 766.001 (2016).
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woman's contributions to marriage as equal to, and worthy of the
same recognition, as her husband's.167 Centuries after the creation
of the community property regime, however, it still fails to live up
to that promise. Moreover, separate property regimes in the oth-
er forty-one states do even worse. Marital property regimes fail to
empower the women they intended to aid both by failing to tru-
ly recognize human capital as a marital asset, and by persisting in
equitable division of property.
A. Ignoring Human Capital
Both community and separate property regimes alike treat
the results of a spouse's labor in the marketplace as divisible mar-
ital property.168 When both spouses work outside the home and
earn in parity with one another, marital property regimes benefit
the spouses equally.169 The current reality, however, is that women
do not work outside the home as frequently as men.170 And even
when they do choose these roles, they are undercompensated as
compared to their male counterparts.17 1 The unwillingness of mod-
167 WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL I VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 24 (2d ed. 1971); Emilia Pirgova, Can the Texas Economic Contribu-
tion Statute Be Reconciled with the Inception of Title Doctrine?, 12 TEx. WESLEY-
AN L. REV. 655, 662 (2006).
168 Cf Delaney v. McCoy, 47240, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/12); 93 So. 3d 845,
848 (discussing the Louisiana statue providing for aggregate partition upon dis-
solution of the community); Allen v. Allen, 607 S.E.2d 331, 333-34 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) ("In equitable distribution actions, the trial court is required to clas-
sify, value, and distribute the marital and divisible property of the parties. Once
the court classifies property as marital or divisible property, it must distribute
that property equitably.").
169 Susan Westerberg Prager, Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law,
in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 116-122 (Barrie Thorne
& Marilyn Yalom, eds., 1982).
170 In 2008, women made up 48 percent of the workforce to men's 52 per-
cent. The Economics Daily, Women's Share of Labor Force to Edge Higher by
2008, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 14, 2000), http://www.bls.gov/opub/
ted/2000/feb/wk3/art01.htm [https://perma.cc/VL6F-RZRR]. In 2000, 23 per-
cent of mothers with children under eighteen did not work outside the home;
however, statisticians and sociologists have observed the numbers of stay-at-
home mothers steadily rising over the past fifteen years. The Return of the Stay-
at-Home Mother, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/united-states/21600998-after-falling-years-proportion-mums-who-stay-
home-rising-return [https://perma.cc/6QZM-PHQW]
17 In 2010, the ratio between men and women's earnings across all indus-
tries was 81.2 percent. The disparity varied in different fields, with lower ratios
in professional occupations; female lawyers earned 771 percent of their male
counterparts salaries, and women working as personal financial advisors gar-
nered a mere 58.4 percent as compared to men in the same positions. Spotlight
on Statistics, Women at Work, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (March 2011), http://
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ern marital property regimes to treat spouses' human capital as a
marital asset exacerbates this problem.
Complicating the issue is that married couples make long-term
economic decisions and plans jointly.172 "These decisions shape not
only wealth and debt acquisitions, but also predictably affect earn-
ing power at divorce and for a period of years afterwards."173 Neither
spousal support nor property distribution schemes are equipped to
handle the long-term effects of these decisions adequately.74 As a
result, gender inequality is further perpetuated "as husbands tend
to realize the advantages and wives tend to bear the disadvantages
produced at least in part by a collaborative economy.""
At the heart of the inequity is the failure of marital property
law to recognize, and mandate sharing, of the human resources of
marriage. Perhaps the most striking example is the refusal of all
but two states to treat professional degrees and licenses as marital
property. 176 Insurance is, likewise, not generally considered marital
property to be shared between the spouses.17 7 And states almost
universally fail to recognize earning capacity as a divisible asset.178
For many couples, however, these are the only things of value a cou-
ple owns at the dissolution of the marriage. 179 Nearly without fail, it
is women, and not men, who are prejudiced by the law's failure to
recognize these important human resources. 10
www.bls.gov/spotlight/2011/women [https://perma.cc/3J9L-JS88].
172 See JANET STOCKS, CAPITOLINA DfAZ MARTfNEZ & BJ6RN HALLEROD, MOD-
ERN COUPLES SHARING MONEY, SHARING LIFE 49 (2007); JAN PAHL, MONEY AND
MARRIAGE 126-27 (1989) (finding families tended towards collective rather than
individualistic structures).
173 Alicia B. Kelley, Sharing Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967 973 (2013).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See Jayaram v. Jayaram, 880 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306-07 (App. Div. 2009); Hau-
gan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Wis. 1984).
1 See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 20 So. 3d 396,397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Moore
v. Moore, 189 S.W.3d 627 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
17s See, e.g., Barner v. Barner, 716 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265,1269 (Ind. 1999); Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d
946, 950 (Mass. 1987).
179 See Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Wis. 1984) ("[1]n a marital
partnership where both parties work toward the education of one of the part-
ners and the marriage ends before the economic benefit is realized and prop-
erty is accumulated ... the degree 'is the most significant asset of the marriage'
and 'it is only fair' that the supporting spouse be compensated for costs and op-
portunities foregone while the student spouse was in school.").
Iso Garrison, supra note 117 at 411.
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B. Equitable, Not Equal, Division
Similarly troubling is the predilection in American marital
property law to distribute property among spouses equitably rather
than equally. Indeed, thirty-four states have adopted an equitable
division scheme."' "The result, according to a number of studies, is
that husbands end up with a majority of marital property as well as
with greater earning potential."1 82
Ironically, equitable distribution schemes were developed
to help women. Equitable distribution was proposed to "promote
a sense of fairness in the treatment of women upon divorce" by
accounting for both financial and more personal contributions to
the family.18 3 But multiple studies have shown that the realities of
the gender wage gap and the refusal of marital property law to
adequately value human capital as a marital asset actually "result
in a bias towards women, rather than benefitting them." 18 4 The dis-
cretionary nature of equitable distribution schemes simply allows
judges the leeway to enforce a body of marital property law that
1I Parrish v. Parrish, 617 So.2d 1036 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); Hayes v. Hayes,
756 P2d 298 (Alaska 1988); In Re Marriage of McVey, 641 P2d 300 (Colo. App.
1981); Tuller v. Tuller, 469 So. 2d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Goldstein v.
Goldstein, 414 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1992); Au-Hoy v. Au-Hoy, 590 P.2d 80 (Haw.
1979); In re Marriage of Aschwanden, 411 N.E.2d 238 (Ill.1980); In re Marriage
of Peterson, 491 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of Sadecki,
825 P.2d 108 (Kan. 1992); Quiggins v. Quiggins 637 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. Ct. App.
1982); Axtell v. Axtell 482 A.2d 1261 (Me. 1984); Ward v. Ward, 449 A.2d 443
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results in women bearing more of the financial losses of a couple's
joint decision-making than is equitable.8
Far from empowering women, modern marital property law
does the opposite. What began as a system designed to serve the
interests of women has become-largely through an overly narrow
conception of shared property and an unwavering adherence to
equitable distribution-just another mechanism of "reinforce[ing]
men's control within the family before and after the divorce."186
V. CONCLUSION
Feminists have a significant opportunity in this fourth wave
to make great strides for female empowerment. Feminists in family
law, in particular, must take a close look at the doctrines of their
field and take the difficult and necessary steps to improve them
where inequality persists.
Inequalities persist in honoring female reproductive choic-
es. Wholly failing to respect the decision-making of women in this
arena substantially undermines the empowerment tenet of mod-
ern feminism. Treatment of all women relinquishing eggs as strang-
er-"donors" simply exacerbates the message that women are enti-
tled to little respect when it comes to their bodies and their children.
When it comes to money, however, modern family law treats
women even worse. Legislatures purport to give women a boon in
allowing them punitive damages and increased spousal support in
the domestic violence context. But these "remedies" are both illu-
sory and damaging in the real world. Where the law could easily
honor women's contributions to the family in a financially reward-
ing manner-namely, in marital property-it simply fails to do so.
The result is a body of family law far afield of feminist ideals.
Indeed, there is much work to do.
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